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Wynne: It’s Not About Double Taxation
by Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason
I. Introduction
On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in Wynne v. Comptroller1 on grant of certio-
rari from the Maryland Court of Appeals.2 The case, which
is a rare state tax discrimination case to reach the Supreme
Court,3 presents an opportunity for the Court to rationalize
its dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. That jurispru-
dence has attracted intense criticism from commentators.4
The Supreme Court has labeled its own tax discrimination
jurisprudence a ‘‘quagmire’’ and ‘‘tangled underbrush.’’5
We use economic analysis to show that Maryland’s tax
regime discriminates against interstate commerce. We also
argue that the parties’ framing of the central issue in the case
— whether the Constitution requires states to relieve double
taxation — draws focus away from the discrimination ques-
tion and could undermine the Wynnes’ case and lead to
unjustified narrowing of the dormant commerce clause. We
also show how our approach to tax discrimination resolves
many of the issues that seemed to trouble the justices at oral
argument.
II. Economic Analysis of the
Dormant Commerce Clause
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Requires
Competitive Neutrality
States violate the dormant commerce clause when they
encourage in-state commerce at the expense of interstate
commerce. The comparison embedded in that statement is
important. The Constitution does not prevent states from
discouraging commerce generally, as any tax that falls on
commerce may discourage it. Thus, the dormant commerce
clause does not prevent a state from taxing all income earned
within the state even though such a tax will discourage both
residents and nonresidents from earning income within the
state.6 The clause also does not prevent a state from taxing all
income (both in-state and out-of-state) earned by residents
even though such a tax might discourage residents from
engaging in income-generating activity.7
Our view is that the Supreme Court interprets the dor-
mant commerce clause to require what we call competitive
neutrality, or a level playing field between in-state and
interstate commerce.8 Competitive neutrality has two re-
quirements: (1) A state cannot provide residents with an1Docket No. 13-485.
2Comptroller of theTreasury v.Wynne, 64 A.3d 453 (Md. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014).
3Michael S. Greve, ‘‘The Dormant Coordination Clause,’’ 67
Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 269, 270 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court
has decided only five state tax discrimination cases under the dormant
commerce clause since 1997).
4See, e.g., DanT. Coenen and Walter Hellerstein, ‘‘Suspect Linkage:
The Interplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Applica-
tion of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules,’’ 95 Mich. L. Rev.
2167, 2173 (1997) (describing the doctrine as in need of a principled
approach).
5Nw. States Portland Cement v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-458
(1959); see also Wardair Canada Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Revenue, 477 U.S.
1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (referring to ‘‘the cloudy waters of this Court’s ‘dormant
commerce clause’ doctrine’’).
6These locational distortions (when involving capital) are referred
to as violations of capital export neutrality, or CEN.
7These distortions (when involving capital) are referred to as viola-
tions of capital import neutrality, or CIN.
8See Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax Discrimina-
tion?’’ 121 Yale L.J. 1014, 1060-1074 (2012); Mason and Knoll,
‘‘Waiting for Perseus,’’ 67 Tax L. Rev. 375, 436-441 (2014). These
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advantage over nonresidents when both compete to earn
income in the state, and (2) a state cannot discourage
residents from earning out-of-state income rather than in-
state income. While we cannot hope to make a conclusive
case for competitive neutrality in this article, support for the
claim can be found in prominent cases.9
B. What Competitive Neutrality Means for
State Taxation
Each state can tax three kinds of income:
• domestic income — in-state income earned by resi-
dents;
• outbound income — out-of-state income earned by
residents; and
• inbound income — in-state income earned by non-
residents.
States generally lack jurisdiction under the due process
clause to tax the income that nonresidents earn in other
states. This section uses economics to describe what we
mean when we construe the Court’s dormant commerce
clause doctrine to require competitive neutrality or a level
playing field.
We present the economic analysis using a two-state ex-
ample involving Maryland and Delaware, in which Dela-
ware stands in for all states other than Maryland. The share
of income that a taxpayer retains after paying tax is called a
retention rate. Table 1 provides, for each kind of income
taxable by Maryland, retention rates for Maryland and
non-Maryland (proxied by Delaware) taxpayers after paying
Maryland tax. To keep the example simple, we assume that
Delaware does not impose any tax. So the retention rates in
Table 1 represent the share of earnings retained after Mary-
land tax.
The retention rate for a Maryland resident on an invest-
ment in Maryland is 1 -Td, whereTd is Maryland’s tax on its
residents’ in-state income (that is, Maryland’s domestic tax).
Likewise, the retention rate for a Maryland resident on an
investment in Delaware is 1 - To, where To is Maryland’s tax
on residents’ out-of-state income (that is, Maryland’s out-
bound tax).
The retention rate for a Delaware resident on an invest-
ment in Maryland is 1 - Ti, where Ti is Maryland’s tax on
nonresidents’ Maryland-source income (that is, Maryland’s
inbound tax). Because Maryland does not tax nonresidents’
out-of-state income, a Delaware resident’s after-Maryland-
tax retention rate on an investment in Maryland equals 1.
Because investors allocate capital across investments in
different taxing jurisdictions based on relative retention
ratios (that is, comparisons of retention ratios),10 we need to
calculate the retention ratios of Maryland and Delaware
residents on investments in Maryland and Delaware. A
Maryland resident’s retention ratio is the share of income
remaining when she invests in Maryland relative to what
remains when she invests outside Maryland (in Delaware).
Thus, a Maryland resident’s retention ratio on an invest-
ment (in Maryland relative to an investment in Delaware) is
(1 - Td)/(1 - To). Similarly, a Delaware resident’s retention
distortions (when involving capital) are commonly referred to as
capital ownership neutrality, or CON.
9For example, in West Lynn Creamery, the Supreme Court used the
dormant commerce clause to strike down a tax that applied to both
resident and nonresident milk dealers because it was linked to a
preferential subsidy for resident milk producers. In the Court’s view,
the combination of the tax and preferential subsidy ‘‘neutraliz[ed] the
advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state producers.’’ West Lynn
Creamery Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994). This analysis
expressly shows a concern that state taxes should not undermine
nonresidents’ comparative advantage over residents. See also West Lynn
Creamery Inc. at 193 (noting that the Constitution forbids tariffs
because they ‘‘artificially encourage in-state production even when the
same goods could be produced at a lower cost in other states’’).
10Our approach is rooted in the theory of finance, particularly in
the theory of portfolio allocation in the presence of taxes. In an
environment without taxes, the major result of capital asset pricing
models (CAPMs) is that all investors end up holding the full universe
of available risky assets in the same proportion as those assets are
available in the market. Investors might vary the amount of riskless
debt and risky assets they hold, and, of course, the total amount
invested in risky assets will differ depending on the size of one’s
investment portfolio and attitude toward risk, but everyone will hold
the same portfolio of risky assets, differing only in the size of the
portfolio, but not in the relative portion of the portfolio (of risky assets)
invested in each asset. The risky portfolio of assets held by each
taxpayer is called the market portfolio because it is composed of a pro
rata portion of all available (risky) assets. The after-tax capital asset
pricing model (after-tax CAPM) describes how taxes affect how inves-
tors allocate their investment capital across assets in an environment
with differentially taxed assets and taxpayers. The main insight from
the after-tax CAPM is that an investor’s demand for an asset is
determined not by a simple comparison of how an investor is taxed on
that asset relative to how other investors are taxed on that same asset.
Instead, an investor’s demand for an asset is determined by how she is
taxed on that asset relative to how she is taxed on the market portfolio
as compared with how other investors are taxed on that asset relative to
how they are taxed on the market portfolio. The central result is that an
investor will invest more in an asset when she is taxed lightly relative to
how she is taxed on the market portfolio as compared with how other
investors are taxed on the asset relative to how they are taxed on the
market portfolio.The converse also holds: An investor will invest less in
an asset on which she is taxed more heavily relative to the market
portfolio than are other investors. See Michael Brennan, ‘‘Taxes, Mar-
ket Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy,’’ 23 Nat’l Tax J. 417
(1970); Roger H. Gordon and David F. Bradford, ‘‘Taxation and the
Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and Dividends,’’ 14 J. Pub.
Econ. 109 (1980).
Table 1.
Retention Rates on Income Taxable by Maryland
Maryland
Resident
Delaware
Resident
Activity in Delaware Outbound Income
1 - To
1
Activity in Maryland Domestic Income
1 - Td
Inbound Income
1 - Ti
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ratio on an investment (in Maryland relative to an invest-
ment in Delaware) is the share of income she retains when
she invests in Maryland relative to what she retains when she
invests in Delaware. Thus, a Delaware resident’s retention
ratio on an investment in Maryland is (1 - Ti)/1, or 1 - Ti.
In order for Maryland taxes not to discriminate against
interstate commerce, the retention ratio for residents of
Maryland across Maryland and Delaware must be less than
or equal to the retention ratio for residents of Delaware
across Maryland and Delaware.11 This requirement can be
written as:
(1 - Td)/(1 - To) ≤ (1 - Ti)/1 (1)
Equation 1 describes the situation in which income taxes
do not distort interstate competition in terms of retention
rates, which are the share of pretax income taxpayers retain
after paying Maryland tax. This shows how tax, through
individual investment choice, affects interstate competition.
When, as in Wynne, the constitutional challenge is to a
state’s tax rates, and not to its base, the above logic reduces to
a straightforward mathematical guideline for avoiding dis-
torting interstate competition:
Td ≥ To + Ti - (To x Ti) (2)
That is, the tax rate applied to the domestic income of
residents must equal or exceed the sum of the tax rates paid
by residents on out-of-state income and by nonresidents on
domestic income less the product of those two rates.12 If a
state’s tax rates do not satisfy Equation 2, its tax system
discriminates against interstate commerce.13 Notice that
this equation does not specify any of the rates; rather it
specifies the relationship that the rates must maintain with
respect to each other. A state may set its tax rates as high or
as low as it wants. The dormant commerce clause, however,
prevents a state from setting its tax on domestic income
independently from its tax on interstate (inbound and out-
bound) income.
Courts interpreting the dormant commerce clause need
not engage in the kind of economic analysis we presented
here (let alone the more extensive analysis of our earlier
articles). Instead, the principle that underlies the dormant
commerce clause — that states should not distort competi-
tion between their residents and residents of other states —
generates simple rules of thumb. One rule, represented by
Equation 1, is that a state must set tax rates so that retention
ratios for residents and nonresidents are equal across juris-
dictions. A second rule, represented by Equation 2, is that
the tax rate on residents’ in-state income must equal the
combined tax rate on the in-state income of nonresidents
and on the out-of-state income of residents.14 In other
words, the tax rate on domestic income must be equal to or
greater than the tax rate on interstate income, composed of
inbound and outbound economic activities.
In earlier work, we described a third rule — that state
taxes must be uniform.15 A source tax is uniform if it applies
at the same rate and on the same base16 to both residents’
and nonresidents’ income from the state. A residence tax is
uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same base to
residents’ in-state and out-of-state income. And if a state
taxes on both a source and residence basis, it must apply
both source and residence taxes to its residents’ in-state
income.
Still another rule of thumb is one the Supreme Court
introduced in 1983 and currently uses in state tax discrimi-
nation cases, namely, the internal consistency test.17 The
next section describes that test and shows the equivalence of
the test to the economic analysis just presented.
C. Competitive Neutrality in the Court’s Doctrine:
The Internal Consistency Test
In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,18 the
Court adopted the modern four-part test for evaluating state
taxes under the dormant commerce clause. A state tax does
not violate the commerce clause if it (i) applies to an activity
with substantial nexus to the taxing state; (ii) is fairly appor-
tioned; (iii) does not discriminate against out-of-state par-
ties; and (iv) fairly relates to services provided by the taxing
state. In most dormant commerce clause cases, including
Wynne, the first and fourth prongs are not at issue. Instead,
dormant commerce clause disputes involve the middle two
prongs, both of which relate to the ideal of a level playing
field between in-state and out-of-state parties.
In many dormant commerce clause cases since 1983, the
Supreme Court has used the internal consistency test to
11How taxation affects competition between residents of different
states depends upon relative retention ratios. If the parties’ ratios are
the same (even though their tax rates are different), taxation will not
affect where either party invests. If, however, their ratios are different,
taxation will distort competition. Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax
Discrimination?’’ supra note 8.
12Expressed differently, the tax rate Maryland applies to its resi-
dents’ Maryland-source income must be the same as if Maryland first
applied the rate applicable to residents’ out-of-state income and then
applied to the remaining income the rate applicable to nonresidents’
Maryland-source income.
13Mason and Knoll, ‘‘Waiting for Perseus,’’ supra note 8 (providing
an algebraic derivation of non-distortion conditions).
14The first two rules (retention ratios and tax rates) apply when the
only issue in dispute is tax rates, not tax bases. The uniformity rule and
the internal consistency test apply to cases involving base or rate
challenges, or both. All four rules require adjustment when the resi-
dence state provides a credit for foreign taxes. See, e.g., Mason and
Knoll, ‘‘Waiting for Perseus,’’ supra note 8, at 1074.
15Id. (describing uniformity requirements for taxes not to distort
competition).
16Tax base refers to the rules for calculating taxable income.
17Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983).
18430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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evaluate the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination
prongs of the Complete Auto test.19 Under the Court’s
doctrine:
internal consistency is preserved when the imposition
of a tax identical to the one in question by every other
State would add no burden to interstate commerce
that intrastate commerce would not also bear. This
test asks nothing about the degree of economic reality
reflected by the tax, but simply looks to the structure
of the tax at issue to see whether its identical applica-
tion by every state in the Union would place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage as compared with com-
merce intrastate.20
The internal consistency test directs the reviewing court
to assume every state enacts the challenged tax regime, and
then it asks whether, under such hypothetical harmoniza-
tion, interstate commerce suffers a greater burden than does
in-state commerce. Note the close correspondence between
the internal consistency test, Equation 2, and the require-
ment that all taxes be uniform.21 For a tax system that does
not provide credits for taxes paid on out-of-state income, the
three statements are equivalent and yield the same result.22
The internal consistency test works because it reaches the
same results by logic and intuition that economic analysis
reaches by algebra.
III. Economic Analysis of Wynne
A. Factual and Legal Background
The respondents, Brian and Karen Wynne, married
Maryland residents, own stock in Maxim Healthcare Ser-
vices Inc., a Maryland S corporation that provides health-
care and medical staffing throughout the United States.
Maryland follows federal tax law in treating S corporations
as passthrough entities. In tax year 2006, the Wynnes earned
more than $2.6 million in income, much of it from Maxim,
which filed tax returns in 39 states.23
Maryland formally divides its individual income tax into
a state portion with a maximum rate of 4.75 percent, and a
county portion with rates ranging from 1.25 to 3.2 per-
cent.24 Maryland collects both portions of the tax, but it
remits the county portion to the counties. Although Mary-
land formally labels part of its tax as a county tax and part as
a state tax, it is settled law that Maryland’s county tax
constitutes a state tax for constitutional law purposes, and
no party contests that issue in Wynne.25
Maryland allows taxes paid to other states to fully offset
the portion of its tax that Maryland labels the state tax, but
it disallows any credit against the county tax.26 Thus, al-
though the Wynnes received credit for taxes paid to other
states against the Maryland state tax, they received no credit
against their Maryland county tax. The substance of the
dispute in Wynne concerns only the county tax.
Ignoring the uncontested state portion of the tax, the
Maryland tax regime contains the following elements.
For residents:
• on income earned in Maryland, county tax of 1.25
percent to 3.2 percent, depending on the county of
residence (we call this the domestic tax);27 and
• on income earned in other states, county tax of 1.25
percent to 3.2 percent, depending on the county of
residence, against which there is no credit for other
states’ taxes (we call this the outbound tax).28
For nonresidents:
• on income earned in Maryland, a 1.25 percent county
tax (Maryland calls this the special nonresident tax, or
SNRT; we call it the inbound tax);29 and
• on income earned in other states, no tax.
19See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (applying
internal consistency test in a discrimination case).
20Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. at 185.
21In both substance and form, the internal consistency test is
equivalent to the tax rate rule as described in Equation 2. The left side
of Equation 2, the tax rate on domestic residents’ domestic income, is
the same value as in the unshaded (i.e., in-state income) quadrants of
Table 3. The right side of Equation 2, the total tax rate from applying
the state’s taxes on inbound and outbound commerce, is the same as
the values in the shaded (i.e., interstate income) quadrants of Table 3.
Because the internal consistency test asks whether the tax rates in all
four quadrants are equal, it is essentially asking whether Equation 2
holds. The internal consistency test is also equivalent to the rule that
retention ratios should be equal across residents of different states
because that rule, which was mathematically expressed in Equation 1,
was the source from which Equation 2 was derived. Finally, internal
consistency is also equivalent to the uniformity requirement: Nonuni-
form tax laws fail the internal consistency test because a system with
nonuniform laws violates Equation 2.
22Because Maryland does not grant credits against its county tax,
we can use the simplified formula in evaluating Wynne. The calcula-
tions become more complicated in cases in which residence states
provide credits for source taxes. See Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax
Discrimination?’’ supra note 8, at 1063-1064, 1072-1074.
23Petitioner’s brief, at 5-6.
24Md. Code Ann., Tax-General (Md. T.G.) sections 10-102, 10-
103(a)(1).
25See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946)
(striking down a municipal license tax on business solicitors for violat-
ing the dormant commerce clause); see also Frey v. Comptroller of
Treasury, 29 A.3d 475, 492 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Maryland’s
county income taxes were state taxes for constitutional law purposes).
26Md. T.G. section 10-703(a).
27Md. T.G. section 10-103(a)(1).
28Md. T.G. sections 10-103(a)(1), 10-703.
29Md. T.G. section 10-106.1(a). Just as it taxes residents, Maryland
subjects nonresidents with Maryland-source income to the 4.75 per-
cent state portion of the Maryland individual income tax, but we
ignore the state portion of the tax for purposes of this analysis. See Md.
T.G. section 10-105(d). In lieu of the SNRT, Maryland subjects
nonresidents who receive compensation for employment in Maryland
to the county tax rates ranging from 1.25 to 3.2 percent. See Md. T.G.
section 10-103(a)(4). Nonresidents with Maryland income from
sources other than employment pay the SNRT, which Maryland sets
equal to the lowest county tax rate, 1.25 percent.
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The Wynnes resided in Howard County, where the
county tax rate was 3.2 percent, so the Wynnes paid county
tax of 3.2 percent on their domestic and outbound in-
come.30 Table 2 illustrates the Maryland county tax regime
for Howard County:
B. Maryland’s Tax Regime Is Internally Inconsistent
Recall that the internal consistency test directs a court to
assume every state enacts the same tax regime, and then asks
whether, under such hypothetical harmonization, interstate
commerce suffers a greater burden than does in-state com-
merce. Table 3 shows how income would be taxed if every
other state (represented here by Delaware) adopted the
Maryland Howard County tax:
Table 3 shows that the Maryland county tax is internally
inconsistent because under hypothetical harmonization, in-
state income would be taxed at 3.2 percent, whereas inter-
state income would be taxed at 4.45 percent. The shaded
quadrants in Table 3 represent interstate income, compris-
ing Maryland income earned by Delaware residents and
Delaware income earned by Maryland residents. In con-
trast, the unshaded quadrants represent in-state income,
comprising Maryland income earned by Maryland residents
and Delaware income earned by Delaware residents. Ac-
cordingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that
the Maryland tax regime violates the internal consistency
test.31
The court of appeals left it to the Maryland General
Assembly to choose how to remedy the violation.32 The
court clarified that its holding did not require Maryland to
use a credit to cure its constitutional violation.33 By this
clarification, the Maryland Court of Appeals expressly ac-
knowledged that there are multiple ways that Maryland
could revise its tax system so as to pass constitutional mus-
ter.34
As the discussion above suggests, the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals was a straightforward applica-
tion of existing legal doctrine, particularly the internal con-
sistency test. Thus, Wynne seems like an easy case, and it
lacks the usual indicia for granting certiorari, such as a
conflict between circuits.35 That raises the question of why
the U.S. Supreme Court took the case. To help answer this
question, we turn to the arguments made by the parties and
amici in Wynne.
C. Maryland’s Defenses
Among other defenses, Maryland argues that its tax
regime does not discriminate. It also argues that Maryland’s
need for money and the duty of its residents, including the
Wynnes, who consume services in Maryland trump consti-
tutional concerns. Finally, Maryland argues that the exces-
sive taxes the Wynnes pay are not solely the fault of Mary-
land; rather, they arise because of the interaction of
Maryland’s tax system with those of other states, and there-
fore Maryland cannot be held accountable for any adverse
impact.
1. No Discrimination
Maryland argues that its tax does not violate the dormant
commerce clause because it does not discriminate. All dis-
crimination standards involve comparisons, and the most
30The Wynnes also paid the state portion of the Maryland tax, and
against that portion received credits for taxes paid to other states.
31Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 466 (2013)
(concluding that ‘‘the circumstances under which the courts have
tolerated a lack of internal consistency [such as flat usage fees] do not
pertain here’’). See also Wynne at 470 (concluding that the Maryland
regime violated the dormant commerce clause by failing to credit other
states’ taxes). Maryland fails the internal consistency test regardless of
the county analyzed. If, for example, we apply the internal consistency
test to the lowest Maryland county tax rate of 1.25 percent, then
in-state income is always taxed at 1.25 percent, whereas interstate
income is always taxed at 2.5 percent. Maryland’s county tax rate on
cross-border income is always 1.25 percent higher than the county tax
rate on domestic income.
32See Wynne, 64 A.3d at 478.
33Petitioner’s cert. brief, appendix B, opinion on motion for recon-
sideration, p. 51 (‘‘A state may avoid discrimination against interstate
commerce by providing a tax credit, or some other method of appor-
tionment, to avoid discriminating against interstate commerce in
violation of the dormant commerce clause’’).
34See id.
35Greve, supra note 3, at 270.
Table 2.
Maryland County Tax Regime
Maryland
Resident
Resident of
Another State
Activity in Another State Outbound Tax
3.2%
N/A
Activity in Maryland Domestic Tax
3.2%
Inbound Tax
1.25%
Table 3.
Maryland Tax Under the Internal Consistency Test
Maryland
Resident
Delaware
Resident
Activity in Delaware 4.45%a 3.2%
Activity in Maryland 3.2% 4.45%
aDelaware, employing a tax regime identical to Maryland’s, would im-
pose a special nonresident tax of 1.25 percent on taxpayers such as the
Wynnes, who reside in Maryland but earn income in Delaware. Mary-
land would neither credit the Delaware SNRT against its own 3.2 per-
cent residence-based county tax nor allow a deduction for the SNRT
paid to Maryland. The Delaware source-based SNRT tax (or county tax)
plus the Maryland residence-based county tax yields a total source-and-
residence tax rate of 4.45 percent.
Special Report
State Tax Notes, February 16, 2015 417
(C
) T
ax A
nalysts 2015. A
ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
contentious part of tax discrimination cases can be deter-
mining how to properly make the comparisons. In Wynne,
Maryland urges the Court to compare Maryland’s treat-
ment of its own residents’ Maryland-source income with its
treatment of their out-of-state income. As long as the do-
mestic rate is no lower than the outbound rate (that is, Td ≥
To), under Maryland’s view, the tax is not discriminatory.
Because Maryland applies the same rate to its residents’
domestic and outbound income, according to the comptrol-
ler, the Maryland tax is constitutional.36
However, in Comptroller v. Frey,37 an earlier case chal-
lenging application of Maryland’s inbound tax regime to
nonresidents, the comptroller offered a different compari-
son. In that case, the comptroller convinced the Maryland
Court of Appeals that it should compare Maryland’s treat-
ment of residents’ Maryland-source income with Mary-
land’s treatment of nonresidents’ Maryland-source income.
In other words, the court should compare Maryland’s do-
mestic tax with its inbound tax, and as long as the domestic
tax was at least as high as the inbound tax (that is, Td ≥ Ti),
Maryland did not discriminate, according to the comptrol-
ler. Because, under that limited comparison, Maryland
treated nonresidents more favorably than residents, the
court of appeals concluded in Frey that Maryland did not
violate the dormant commerce clause.38
Thus, in Frey, the comptroller persuaded the Maryland
court to consider whether Maryland discriminated against
only inbound commerce. Now, just five years later in
Wynne, the comptroller asks the Supreme Court to evaluate
the question whether Maryland discriminates against only
outbound commerce. Combining these arguments, we ar-
rive at Maryland’s understanding of the limits the dormant
commerce clause places on state taxation, namely that:
Td ≥ To and Td ≥ Ti (3)
Under the comptroller’s theory, a state’s outbound and
inbound taxes have no necessary relationship to each other,
and so long as each is less than or equal to the domestic tax,
the comptroller would argue that there is no constitutional
violation. This is even though Maryland’s inbound and
outbound taxes impose a cumulative burden on interstate
commerce that exceeds by Maryland’s single imposition of
tax on domestic income.
Combining Frey with Wynne illustrates the problem. In
Frey, the comptroller compared Maryland’s inbound tax
with its domestic tax;39 in Wynne, the comptroller compares
Maryland’s outbound tax with its domestic tax. Double-
counting the domestic tax obscures that although Maryland
taxes residents’ domestic income once, it taxes interstate
commerce both coming and going.40 The combined Mary-
land taxes on interstate commerce (that is, the inbound tax
plus the outbound tax) total 4.45 percent, thus exceeding
the Maryland tax on residents’ domestic income of 3.2
percent. If all states adopted similar regimes, interstate com-
merce would always face more tax than domestic commerce.
As the economic analysis above shows, determining whether
a state discriminates against interstate income requires com-
paring the state’s domestic tax with its total burden on
interstate commerce, composed of its inbound and out-
bound taxes.41
Because the internal consistency test prevents disaggrega-
tion of the state tax regime into inbound-only and
outbound-only elements, it prevents the kind of incomplete
analysis urged by the comptroller in both Wynne and Frey. It
therefore reduces the risk that states will eviscerate the
clause’s protection for interstate commerce by embedding
discriminatory tax provisions in disparate parts of their tax
regimes.
At oral argument, Eric J. Feigin, the assistant U.S. solici-
tor general, argued that the Wynnes should not be able to
point to the inbound tax (the SNRT) as part of their
discrimination analysis because, as residents, they were not
subject to it. He added that the nonresident tax ‘‘is going to
look discriminatory no matter what other scheme of taxes
you throw into it.’’42 He argued that if the Court found the
Maryland tax regime discriminatory, ‘‘it would probably be
much more logical to locate the problem in the nonresident
tax rather than the resident tax.’’43 When pressed by Justice
Samuel Alito about whether he thought the nonresident tax
was unconstitutional, Feigin replied that he did not but only
that ‘‘it would be a stronger claim.’’44
36Petitioner’s brief at 35-36. The assistant to the U.S. solicitor
general also urges comparing the domestic tax only with the outbound
tax, describing the taxes as ‘‘uniform’’ and ‘‘even-handed.’’ Wynne,
argument transcript, at 23.
3729 A.3d. 475 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1796 (2012).
38See Frey, 29 A.3d at 501.
39Frey, 29 A.3d at 496, 505.
40To avoid discouraging interstate commerce, Maryland could, for
example, impose both taxes — the residence tax and the source tax —
on residents’ Maryland income. In that case, Maryland would have
uniform taxes — a uniform source tax of 1.25 percent and a uniform
residence tax of 3.2 percent. But there are other alternatives for
Maryland to cure its violation, as we discuss in Part IV.D.
41The comptroller’s analysis is wrong, because it obscures the fact
that the Maryland tax system disadvantages nonresidents compared
with residents. This disadvantage is evident because the retention ratio
for Maryland residents on their income earned in Maryland relative to
their income earned outside Maryland is higher than the same ratio for
nonresidents. In a recent working paper, economists Ryan Lirette and
Alan Viard reached the same conclusion about the need to compare the
state’s tax on domestic income with the cumulative burden the state
applies to inbound and outbound income. See Lirette and Viard, ‘‘State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Income Flows: The Economics
of Neutrality,’’ American Enterprise Institute working paper 2014-07
(Sept. 23, 2014).
42Wynne, argument transcript, at 18.
43Id. at 20-1.
44Id. at 23.
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We disagree. While we conclude that the Maryland re-
gime, taken as a whole, discriminates against interstate
commerce, we do not believe that it is possible as a matter of
logic or economics to isolate the source of the discrimina-
tion to any one of the domestic tax, the inbound tax, or the
outbound tax. All three tax rates must be analyzed together,
and they must obey the relationship in Equation 2. Thus, it
should not be possible to save Maryland’s tax regime by
arguing that it is the inbound tax (rather than the outbound
tax) that discriminates.
2. Revenue Argument
Maryland and amici make much of Maryland’s need for
tax revenue and of the benefits that the Wynnes receive from
Maryland. Maryland and amici further claim that holding
for the Wynnes would allow the Wynnes and others simi-
larly situated to avoid paying for their share of the services
they consume.
It is important to note that worldwide tax with a full
credit ensures that a resident with out-of-state income pays
at least as much tax as would be due domestically. The
Wynnes could pay more tax under a properly designed
credit than they would pay on an equivalent amount of
domestic income, but they would not pay less.
Of course, Maryland’s concern is that if it credited other
states’ taxes, the taxes paid by the Wynnes on their out-of-
state income would go principally to the source state, and
only residually to Maryland. In its brief, Maryland noted
that the Wynnes (or similar taxpayers) might end up owing
zero income tax to Maryland on their out-of-state income,
and at oral argument, some of the justices raised similar
concerns.45 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave an example in
which granting a credit would mean that ‘‘the Maryland
resident owes nothing to Maryland . . . [even though he]
may have five children that he sends to school in Mary-
land.’’46 Continuing Ginsburg’s example, Justice Anthony
Kennedy commented, ‘‘He’s getting a free ride off Maryland
school.’’47 Because the Wynnes receive significant benefits
from Maryland, it is only fair, the argument goes, that the
Wynnes contribute to fund those benefits, consistent with
their ability to pay.
One response is to note that Maryland taxes not only on
a residence basis, but also on a source basis. What Maryland
loses on a residence basis, it gains on a source basis. Notice
the symmetry: The Wynnes pay taxes to other jurisdictions
while receiving only limited services there (they do not, for
example, send their children to other states’ public schools).
At the same time, Maryland collects revenue from nonresi-
dents who earn income in Maryland, despite using only
limited Maryland services. Thus, Maryland will only lose
revenue on an aggregate basis from interstate commerce if
Maryland residents earn more abroad than the residents of
other states earn in Maryland. Thus, Maryland exaggerates
the revenue loss from maintaining an internally consistent
tax regime. It is telling that every other state besides Mary-
land (not to mention independent countries) appears able to
fund its public sector despite granting credits for out-of-
state taxes.
Moreover, that a state provides services to residents can-
not justify taxes that impede access for its residents to
out-of-state markets and vice versa. The Maryland tax re-
gime challenged in Wynne does both.48 And upholding the
Maryland county tax regime just because Maryland uses the
revenue to pay for services would eviscerate the dormant
commerce clause.
There are other ways that Maryland could tax the Wynnes
to pay for services that would not discriminate against cross-
border commerce and that would be internally consistent.
For example, Maryland could impose a real property tax, a
head tax, or charge a fee to those who send their children to
the public schools. Finally, Maryland could modify its in-
come tax regime to comply with the dormant commerce
clause, while still refusing to credit other states’ taxes.49
3. Who Can Say Which State Is at Fault?
Maryland argues that the higher tax burden the Wynnes
face on cross-border income ‘‘arises from the combination of
the income taxes of two States,’’50 so therefore Maryland is
not responsible for it. This argument seemed to resonate
with Justice Stephen Breyer, who said at oral argument, ‘‘I
don’t see anybody at fault.’’51
What this argument ignores is that the Maryland tax
system would discourage interstate commerce even if no
other state imposed any taxes. If no other state imposed any
taxes, Maryland residents and nonresidents would pay the
same 3.2 percent tax on in-state and out-of-state income
and Maryland residents would retain 96.8 percent of their
before-tax earnings on both in-state and out-of-state in-
come. Thus, the ratio of what Maryland residents retain on
Maryland income as opposed to non-Maryland income is 1.
Nonresidents pay 1.25 percent tax on their Maryland in-
come and so retain 98.75 percent of their Maryland income,
whereas they retain 100 percent of their non-Maryland
income, which is not subject to tax. Thus, nonresidents
retain 98.75 percent as much of their income when they
earn that income in Maryland as when they earn it outside
Maryland. Accordingly, although nonresidents retain a
higher portion of their income than do Maryland residents
wherever they earn income,52 nonresidents retain a rela-
tively smaller ratio of their income when they invest in
45Id. at 29.
46Id.
47Id. at 39.
48See supra Part II.D.
49See infra Part IV.D.
50Wynne, argument transcript, at 22.
51Id. at 23.
52When they invest outside Maryland, nonresidents retain 100
percent of pretax income whereas Maryland residents retain only 96.8
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Maryland as compared with investing outside Maryland
(0.9875) than do residents (1). The inequality in those
retention ratios shows the distortion of competitive neutral-
ity and thereby the tax discrimination.
IV. Distinguishing Double Taxation From
Discriminatory Taxation
Other disputes in Wynne involve whether the dormant
commerce clause forbids double taxation, and if so, whether
the source state or the residence state is obliged to relieve the
double tax. Likewise, there is a dispute over whether the
only appropriate remedy in the case is a tax credit. Justice
Elena Kagan also raised the concern that a ruling in favor of
the Wynnes paradoxically could lead to more double taxa-
tion. This section addresses those arguments.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Precludes Some,
But Not All, Forms of Double Tax
Double tax is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for a dormant commerce clause violation. It is obvious that
a state can discriminate against cross-border commerce
without imposing double taxation. Assume, for example,
that Maryland is the only state to tax, and assume further
that Maryland stops taxing its residents’ out-of-state in-
come, maintains its 3.2 percent tax rate on residents’ domes-
tic income, and increases the SNRT rate on nonresidents’
Maryland income to 5 percent. Although there is no double
taxation, such a tax discriminates against cross-border com-
merce. Nonresidents would face a tax disadvantage in Mary-
land relative to residents because nonresidents would retain
a smaller portion of their revenue earned in Maryland (as
compared with the portion they would retain on revenue
earned in Delaware) than residents.53
Conversely, there can be double taxation without dis-
criminating against cross-border commerce. If Maryland
combines a uniform 3.2 percent residence tax with a uni-
form 1.25 percent source tax and applies both taxes to its
residents’ domestic income (4.41 percent), there is double
taxation, but no discrimination against cross-border com-
merce. Also, if Delaware (standing in for all other states)
adopts a uniform 5 percent residence tax and a uniform 4
percent source tax and applies both taxes to Delaware resi-
dents’ domestic income (8.8 percent), there is double taxa-
tion, but again no discrimination. That is because Maryland
residents retain the same portion of their income earned in
Maryland relative to the proportion retained by Delaware
residents on their Delaware income. There is also no dis-
crimination from combining both the Maryland and Dela-
ware tax systems, even though all cross-border income is
taxed by both Delaware and Maryland.54 Once again, there
is no competitive distortion because the retention ratios
across Maryland and Delaware for Maryland and Delaware
residents are equal.
There is, however, an important case in which avoiding
discrimination requires relief from double taxation. When a
state taxes residents and nonresidents at the same rate on
their in-state income, the only way the state can avoid
discouraging cross-border commerce (and satisfy the inter-
nal consistency test) is to exempt out-of-state income from
tax or provide a credit for taxes paid on out-of-state income.
Those tax systems are common, which is why one might
view the dormant commerce clause as prohibiting double
tax.
By arguing that the dormant commerce clause forbids
double taxation, the taxpayer raised unnecessary contro-
versy. At issue in Wynne is not whether the Constitution
forbids double tax, but rather whether it forbids a state from
using taxes to give residents a competitive advantage over
nonresidents for jobs and investments in the state and
whether it forbids a state from using taxes to give nonresi-
dents a competitive advantage over residents for jobs and
investments outside the state. By its internal inconsistency,
the Maryland tax regime does both: It privileges Mary-
landers over nonresidents when earning income in Mary-
land, and it privileges nonresidents over Marylanders when
earning income outside Maryland.
A constitutional rule that says that a state’s tax law must
be internally consistent is administrable by any state and
requires examination only of that state’s tax regime. In
contrast, a generalized prohibition on double taxation is less
administrable because it requires determining when there
has been double taxation, which in turn depends on careful
comparison of the two states’ tax bases and source rules.55 A
constitutional prohibition on double taxation would raise
other difficult questions, such as the constitutionality of
partial credits, the equivalence of credits and exemption,
and whether the source or residence state has priority to tax,
a question we address in the next section. Finally, it is worth
noting that Supreme Court doctrine does not support in-
terpreting the dormant commerce clause as a blanket prohi-
bition on double taxation.56
percent; when they invest in Maryland, nonresidents retain 98.75
percent while residents retain 96.8 percent.
53Nonresidents retain 95 percent as much of their income when
they earn income in Maryland rather than Delaware, while residents
retain 96.8 percent as much.
54See Mason and Knoll, ‘‘Waiting for Perseus,’’ supra note 8, at
442-452 (providing an extensive example showing that uniform
double taxes do not distort cross-border commerce).
55The Supreme Court in Moorman declined to find that the
dormant commerce clause forbade double taxation in part because
applying such a rule ‘‘would require extensive judicial lawmaking.’’
56Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 98 S. Ct. 2340 (1978)
(approving internally consistent apportionment formula, even though
its application in combination with another state’s different, but also
internally consistent, formula resulted in actual double taxation).
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Does Not Require
The Residence State to Yield to the Source State
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has looked exclusively
to the law of the challenged state in analyzing state tax
dormant commerce clause challenges. The court has said
that the constitutionality of one state’s law cannot ‘‘depend
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other
States.’’57 However, the Wynnes, like the comptroller, ex-
pand the inquiry to at least two states by arguing that the
Constitution requires Maryland to relieve double taxation.
But if the Constitution requires relief of double tax, which
state’s tax must give way? Questions at oral argument sug-
gest that the justices see a holding for Wynne as raising a
‘‘priority rule’’ question. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia
asked, ‘‘Why is it that the State that taxes all the income of its
residents has to yield rather than the State that taxes all
income earned in the State?’’58 In our view, the dormant
commerce clause does not mandate (and need not be inter-
preted as mandating) any priority between the source and
residence states’ taxes.
When asked whether the dormant commerce clause en-
compasses a priority rule, Dominic F. Parella, the Wynnes’
lawyer, argued that the Court’s doctrine establishes a source-
state priority rule, under which the residence state must
yield to the source state’s tax, for example, by granting a
credit. He cited Standard Oil,59 Mobil Oil,60 and Central
Railroad 61 in support of this assertion. Support for a source-
state priority rule can indeed be found in those cases,
particularly for ad valorem taxation of instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.62 If extended to personal income
taxes, a source-state priority rule would reflect the usual state
practice of granting credits at residence, as well as the
international practice of crediting or exempting at resi-
dence. Nevertheless, dormant commerce clause doctrine
provides no clear guidance on which state should relieve
double taxation.63
While the Court’s precedent more strongly supports the
notion of source (rather than residence) priority-to-tax,
there is no need for the Court to establish a priority rule
under the dormant commerce clause in order to resolve the
case in favor of the Wynnes. Rather, all the Court need
require is that states exercise taxing authority on legitimate
bases (source and residence) and that all taxes be uniform on
a source or residence basis. In other words, all taxes must be
internally consistent.
Although it is a minority practice, some source states
unilaterally cede priority to tax to the residence state,64 or
they do so under reciprocal source-exemption provisions.65
Thus, in our view, the Court should answer the priority rule
question in Wynne as it did in Moorman, by stating that:
the legislative power granted to Congress by the com-
merce clause would amply justify the enactment of
legislation requiring all states to adhere to uniform
rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and
not this Court, that the Constitution has committed
those policy decisions.66
C. A Credit Is Not the Only Possible Remedy
If the Wynnes prevail, a question arises as to the appro-
priate remedy. Several amici who support the taxpayers urge
the Court, assuming it finds the Maryland tax unconstitu-
tional, to order Maryland to credit other states’ taxes to
offset the Maryland county tax. However, because there are
several other ways for Maryland to cure its constitutional
infirmity, the Supreme Court should not order Maryland to
issue credits.
To comply with the dormant commerce clause, Mary-
land’s tax rates must obey Equation 2; they must bear the
following relationship to each other:
Td ≥ To + Ti - (To x Ti) (2)
Under this constraint, Maryland has flexibility to set any
two rates however it chooses, but setting the first two rates
constrains the third. For example, suppose Maryland deter-
mines that it wants an inbound income tax rate, Ti, of 1.25
percent. Suppose further that Maryland wants an outbound
57When analyzing state tax discrimination under the commerce
clause, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to require a taxpayer to show
actual discriminatory impact by pointing to a duplicative tax in an-
other U.S. state. ARMCO Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
58See, e.g., Wynne, argument transcript, at 9-10. See also id. at 10,
‘‘Do you stop having the power to tax worldwide income because other
States may tax on a different [source] basis?’’ (Ginsburg, J.).
59Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952) (invalidating
a residence-based ad valorem tax on ships used in interstate commerce
on the grounds that the ‘‘rule which permits taxation by two or more
[source] states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of
the property by the state of the domicile’’).
60Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425
(1980) (holding that a state could tax a nonresident corporation’s
foreign-source dividends by apportionment).
61Central R. of Pa. v. Pa., 370 U.S. 607, 614 (1962) (‘‘the domicili-
ary State is precluded from imposing an ad valorem tax on any property
to the extent that it could be taxed by another State’’).
62Each of the cited cases involved apportionment formulas, so
rather than establishing a source priority rule, these cases instead could
be understood to require fair apportionment. If income ‘‘fairly appor-
tioned to a state’’ is understood to be equivalent to ‘‘income sourced in
a state,’’ the two notions collapse into one. In international tax policy,
apportionment is regarded as an alternative to sourcing rules, but with
the same goal, namely, to allocate taxing rights among states with
legitimate tax claims while at the same time avoiding double taxation.
63Indeed, the leading treatise on state taxation concludes that ‘‘the
question arises as to whether, and under what circumstances, the
Constitution may be read to require a taxpayer’s state of resi-
dence . . . to provide a credit for taxes paid to other states. This is a
complicated question for which the courts have yet to provide a
definitive answer.’’ Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation, at para. 20.10[2][b].
64Id. at para. 20.10.
65Id. at para. 20.10[6].
66See Moorman, 437 U.S. at 280.
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tax rate, To, of 3.2 percent with no credit. Maryland can
implement both of these tax rates consistently with the
dormant commerce clause. The step that Maryland missed
in constructing its tax regime was that the tax rate on the
third basis is algebraically constrained by the first two rates.
Under those conditions, to avoid discriminating against
interstate commerce, Maryland’s tax rate on domestic in-
come, Td, must be no less than the sum of the taxes on the
other two bases, less their product, or 4.41 percent.
Although crediting other states’ taxes generally will cure a
tax’s internal inconsistency,67 the Constitution gives no
answer to the question whether Maryland should, for ex-
ample (1) increase domestic tax, Td, to 4.41 percent,68 (2)
reduce the outbound tax, To, either by eliminating that tax
or by allowing a full credit against it, or (3) eliminate the
1.25 percent inbound tax, Ti. The choice of how to satisfy
Equation 2 remains the sovereign choice of Maryland.
D. A Ruling in Favor of the Taxpayers Could Lead to
More Double State Taxation
At oral argument, Kagan raised the concern that using
internal consistency as the principal test for tax discrimina-
tion could result in a situation in which some states choose
to tax exclusively on a source basis, while others choose to
tax exclusively on a residence basis. Each state’s regime
considered separately would satisfy the internal consistency
test, but a taxpayer who resides in one, but earns income
from the other could face double tax or no tax.69 Kagan is
correct inasmuch as different choices by different states can
affect how many times and at what total rate an individual is
taxed, with the consequence that state taxes will distort
where taxpayers reside, how much they work, and where
they choose to work.
But those kinds of locational distortions are not the evil
the dormant commerce clause was designed to prevent.
Indeed, one of the purposes of our federal system is to
facilitate regulatory and even tax competition among the
states. Rather than preventing competition among the states
for residents and workers, the dormant commerce clause
aims to prevent market segmentation — cases in which a
state uses its tax system to encourage nonresidents to stay
out and residents to stay in. And as long as states enact
uniform source and residence taxes, taxes will not distort
competition (because they will not produce differences in
retention ratios) across taxpayers residing in different states
even though some taxpayers will end up paying no tax,
others will pay tax to only one state, and still others will pay
tax to two states.70
V. Conclusion
In the Court’s language, the crucial question under the
dormant commerce clause is whether a state tax policy
‘‘establishes an economic barrier against competition’’ or an
‘‘unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce.’’71 As
the discussion above makes clear, the Maryland county tax
discourages interstate commerce in favor of in-state com-
merce. The tax regime adversely affects both residents with
out-of-state income and nonresidents with in-state income.
Failure to hold that the Maryland county tax violates the
dormant commerce clause would open the door for states to
use their tax systems to discriminate against interstate com-
merce.
In contrast, the internal consistency test represents a rare
bit of firm ground in the morass of the Court’s dormant
commerce clause doctrine. It is logical, intuitive, easy to
apply, and well supported by economics, and the Court
should not narrow its application. ✰
67Hellerstein and Hellerstein, State Taxation, supra note 63, para.
4.16[1][b]. Note that to satisfy internal consistency, Maryland has to
increase its foreign tax credit only by the SNRT rate of 1.25 percent.
For a discussion of the requirements for state taxes not to distort
interstate commerce when the taxing state is offering a credit for taxes
paid to other states (which differ from those when the state is not
offering a credit), see Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax Discrimina-
tion?’’ supra note 8, at 1063-1064, 1072-1074.
68This is calculated as 3.2 percent + 1.25 percent - (3.2 percent x
1.25 percent) = 4.41 percent.
69Wynne, argument transcript, at 36.
70For an example showing that internally consistent (i.e., uniform)
double taxes do not distort competition, see Mason and Knoll, ‘‘Wait-
ing for Perseus,’’ supra note 8, at 442-452.
71Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 287-288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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